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The Debris Team has developed and implemented measures to control damage from debris in the
Shuttle operational environment and to make the control measures a part of routine launch flows.
These measures include engineering surveillance during vehicle processing and closeout
operations, facility and flight hardware inspections before and after launch, and photographic
analysis of mission events.
Photographic analyses of mission imagery from launch, on-orbit, and landing provide significant
data in verifying proper operation of systems and evaluating anomalies. In addition to the
Kennedy Space Center Photo/Video Analysis, reports from Johnson Space Center and Marshall
Space Flight Center are also included in this document to provide an integrated assessment of the
mission.
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Photo 1: Launch of Shuttle Mission STS-91
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: ; 1.0 SUMMARY
An overall pretest debris inspection of the launch pad and Shuttle vehicle was performed on
17 May 1998. The walkdown of Pad 39A also included the primary flight elements OV-103
Discovery, ET,96, and BI-091 SRB's. There were no significant vehicle or launch pad
anomalies.
A major configuration change, and the reason for the tanking test, was the first use of the new
Super Light Weight (External) Tank (SLWT). Other than the sanded intertank stringers, most of
the changes were internal and therefore not visible. However, postulated contour deviations on
the LO2 tank forward-to-aft ogive weld (station 536, +Z side) could have resulted in as-sprayed
NCFI TPS cracking after the tank was pressurized. Per FEC, a local area 100 inches long by 11
inches wide was sanded over the suspect area to reduce the TPS outer fiber strain and increase
the strain capability of the foam. The foam thickness was reduced from anaverage of 2.30 inches
to 1.25 inches. After machining, the edges of the trim area were beveled. This modification met
all ground, ascent, and re-entry aero/thermal requirements. Nevertheless, the trimmed area was
assessed during cryoloading for the formation of condensate or ice.
i
The Thermal Protection System performed nominally during the tanking test. No anomalies were
detected on the composite nose cone though condensate could be seen over the attach bracket
fastener area between the -Y louver and the fairing. Two cracks were detected in stringer valleys
in the +Y+Z quadrant of the intertank. The cracks appeared to originate from the as-sprayed
foam at the LH2 tank splice extending forward approximately 7 inches. Each crack was no
greater than 1/16 inch wide with no visible offset or ice/frost formation. Although the NSTS-
08303 Ice/Debris Inspection Criteria documents an intertank TPS crack in the -Y-Z quadrant as
acceptable for flight, no such case was available for cracks in the +Y+Z quadrant. Consequently,
an IPR was taken to determine this condition was acceptable for flight as well.
The new cameras mounted in the GOX vent hood were partially successful. The camera
observing the northeast louver failed prior to LO2 tank loading. However, the camera observing
the southwest louver showed no frost formation until the seal was deflated and the hood
retracted. After the GOX vent arm was retracted, no ice formation was detected on either louver
using the regular OTV cameras. During the Final Inspection, condensate had been detected on
the composite nose cone between the fairing and the southwest GOX seal. The condensate may
have formed due to the thermal conductivity of the underlying attachment brackets. If the
formation of condensate in this area is a characteristic of the new composite nose cones,
problems with icing may be encountered during cold weather conditions.
A series of post drain inspections were conducted after the tanking test. From an Ice and TPS
perspective, the tanking test was successful resulting in only minor TPS defects. There were no
TPS constraints for launch cryoload.
A pre-launch debris inspection of the launch pad and Shuttle vehicle was performed on 1 June
1998. The detailed walkdown of Pad 39A and MLP-1 also included the primary flight elements
OV-103 Discovery (24 th flight), ET-96 first Super Light Weight Tank, and BI-091 SRB's. There
were no significant vehicle or launch pad anomalies.
The Final Inspection of the cryoloaded vehicle was performed on 2 June 1998 during the two
hour built-in-hold at T-3 hours in the countdown. There were no Launch Commit Criteria (LCC),
OMRS, or NSTS-08303 criteria violations. No Ice, Debris, or TPS IPR's were taken. There were
no acreage icing concerns. There were also no protuberance icing conditions outside of the
established data base.
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LO2 tank ogive exhibited no anomalies. Light condensate was again visible on the composite
nose cone between the fairing and the southwest louver.
Two small cracks were detected in the +Y+Z quadrant of the intertank. The cracks appeared to
originate from the as-sprayed foam at the aft end of the stringers extending forward
approximately 7 inches from the LH2 tank splice. These two cracks had been documented during
the tanking test. Two new, similar cracks were detected. A 4-inch crack was located in the -Y+Z
quadrant and a 6-8 inch crack was located in the -Y-Z quadrant. All four cracks were no greater
than 1/16 inch wide with no visible offset or ice/frost formation and were acceptable for flight
per the NSTS-08303 criteria and tanking test PR rationale.
A drive adapter used to extend/retract the side platforms on an MLP Tail Service Mast was
discovered by the Final Inspection Team at the northeast corner of the LO2 TSM. The steel
adapter was 2-inches in diameter and weighed a half pound. A recent modification called for the
adapters (three adapters per TSM) to be permanently attached to the drive shafts with set screws.
In this case, the set screw apparently backed out during platform operations causing the adapter
to hang loosely at the end of the shaft. As a result of this finding, all adapters have been changed
to a pinned design.
After the 6:06 p.m. (local time) launch on 2 June 1998, a debris walk down of Pad 39A was
performed. No flight hardware or TPS materials were found. All the T-0 umbilicals operated
properly. Although Boeing - Downey reported an Orbiter liftoff lateral acceleration of 0.19 g's,
which is above the threshold (0.14 g's) for stud hang-ups, an actual stud hand-up did not occur
on this launch. The right SRB aft skirt GN2 purge line was intact and upright after liftoff. The
left GN2 purge flex line was bent in half in the +Z direction and exhibited structural damage
(holes) and melting of the wire braid. Overall, damage to the launch pad was minimal.
A total of 110 films and videos were analyzed as part of the post mission data review. No vehicle
damage or lost flight hardware was observed that would have affected the mission. No stud hang-
ups were observed on any of the eight holddown posts. No ordnance debris or frangible nut
pieces fell from the DCS/stud holes.
OV-103 was equipped to carry umbilical cameras (for the first time): 16mm motion picture with
5 mm lens; 16mm motion picture with 10mm lens; 35mm still views. The flight crew provided
33 hand held still images.
Twenty to twenty-five light colored spots were detected in the -Y thrust panel acreage in an area
bordered by the LO2 and LH2 tank-to-intertank flange closeouts and from the thrust panel-to-
intertank splice to the tank curving out of view in the -Y direction. These light colored spots were
most likely small, shallow divots, most of which were in the areas between the ring frames.
However, some of the possible divots could be seen on the forward ring frame. The +Y thrust
panel was in shadow and no detail could be discerned.
The Solid Rocket Boosters were inspected at Hangar AF after retrieval. Both frustums were in
excellent condition. No missing TPS or debonds/unbonds were detected over fasteners on the
frustums. All eight BSM aero heat shield covers had locked in the fully opened position. The
forward skirts exhibited no debonds or missing TPS. Separation of the aft ET/SRB struts
appeared normal. TPS on the external surface of both aft skirts was intact and in good condition.
Significant areas of missing insulation/cork from the aft surface of the IEA showed the insulation
had not bonded properly. The pristine condition of the primed substrate indicated the insulation
was lost at water impact rather than in flight.
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After the 2:00 p.m. local/eastern time landing on 12 June 1998, a post landing inspection of
OV- 103 Discovery was conducted at the Kennedy Space Center on SLF runway 15.
The Orbiter TPS sustained a total of 198 hits, of which 50 had a major dimension of 1-inch or
larger. A comparison of these numbers to statistics from 71 previous missions of similar
configuration indicates both the total number of hits and the number of hits 1-inch or larger was
greater than average
The Orbiter lower surface sustained 145 total hits, of which 45 had a major dimension of 1-inch
or larger. Most of this damage was concentrated aft of the nose to the main landing gear wheel
wells on both left and fight chines. Virtually no damage occurred on the Orbiter centerline. These
damage sites follow the same location/damage pattern documented on STS-86, STS-87, STS-89,
and STS-90, though it should also be noted that this was the first flight of the new Super Light
Weight Tank. The average size and quantity of damage sites were greater than the favorable
trend established on STS-89 and STS-90:
The largest lower surface tile damage site forward of the main landing gear wheel wells was
located on the left chine and measured 3-inches long by 1.25-inches wide by 0.25-inches deep.
The deepest lower surface tile damage site of 0.5-inches was located on the fight chine.
The Space Shuttle Program continues to work an IFA to prevent loss of foam from the ET thrust
panels and preclude further damage to Orbiter tiles.
4
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2.0 PRE-TANKING/LAUNCH BRIEFING
The Debris/Ice/TPS and Photographic Analysis Team briefing for tanking test activities was
conducted on 15 May 1998 at 1400 hours. The briefing for all launch activities was conducted on
1 June 1998. The following personnel participated in various team activities, assisted in the
collection and evaluation of data, and contributed to reports contained in this document.
P. Weber
G. Katnik
R. Speece
B. Bowen
J. Rivera
R. Page
K. Revay
J. Blue
W. Richards
M. Wollam
G. Fales
T. Ford
J. Stone
C. Hill
B. St. Aubin
S. Otto
J. Ramirez
D. Maxwell
NASA - KSC Chief, ET/SRB Mechanical Systems Branch
NASA - KSC Shuttle Ice/Debris Systems
NASA - KSC Thermal Protection Systems
NASA - KSC Infrared Scanning Systems
NASA - KSC ET Mechanisms/Structures
NASA - KSC SSP Integration
USA - SPC Supervisor, ET/SRB Mechanical Systems
USA - SPC ET Mechanical Systems
USA - SPC
USA- SPC
USA- SPC
USA- SPC
BNA - DNY
BNA - LSS
THIO - LSS
LMSO - LSS
LMSO - LSS
USA- Safety
ET Mechanical Systems
ET Mechanical Systems
ET Mechanical Systems
ET Mechanical Systems
Shuttle Aerodynamics
Systems Integration
SRM Processing
ET Processing
ET Processing
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3.0 TANKING TEST
3.1 PRE-TANKING SSV/PAD INSPECTION
An overall pretest debris inspection of the launch pad and Shuttle vehicle was performed on
17 May 1998. The detailed walkdown of Pad 39A and MLP-1 also included the primary flight
elements OV-103 Discovery, ET-96, and BI-091 SRB's. There were no significant vehicle or
launch pad anomalies.
A major configuration change, and the reason for the tanking test, was the first use of the new
Super Light Weight (External) Tank (SLWT). Other than the sanded intertank stringers, most of
the changes were internal and therefore not visible. However, postulated contour deviations on
the LO2 tank forward-to-aft ogive weld (station 536, +Z side) could have resulted in as-sprayed
NCFI TPS cracking after the tank was pressurized. Per FEC KET-0037, a local area 100 inches
long by 11 inches wide was sanded over the suspect area to reduce the TPS outer fiber strain and
increase the strain capability of the foam. The foam thickness was reduced from an average of
2.30 inches to 1.25 inches. After machining, the edges of the trim area were beveled. This
modification met all ground, ascent, and re-entry aero/thermal requirements. Nevertheless, the
trimmed area was assessed during cryoloading for the formation of condensate or ice.
With the exception of lightning, local weather conditions were not expected to be a constraint to
performing the tanking test. Ambient weather conditions the day of the test consisted of
temperatures in the mid-to-high 70's, relative humidity averaging 65 percent, and 10 knot winds
out of the southwest.
3.2 FINAL INSPECTION
The Final Inspection of the cryoloaded STS-91 vehicle was performed on18 May 1998 from
1300 to 1515 hours during the two hour built-in-hold at T-3 hours in the countdown. There were
no Launch Commit Criteria (LCC), OMRS, or NSTS-08303 criteria violations. No Ice or Debris
IPR's were taken. However, IPR 091V-0152 was taken against cracks in the ET intertank TPS.
A portable Shuttle Thermal Imager (STI) infrared scanning radiometer was utilized to obtain
vehicle surface temperature measurements for an overall thermal assessment of the vehicle,
particularly those areas not visible from remote fixed scanners, and to scan for unusual
temperature gradients.
3.2.1 ORBITER
No anomalies were noted on the Orbiter.
3.2.2 SOLID ROCKET BOOSTERS
No anomalies were noted on the SRB's.
3.2.3 EXTERNAL TANK
The ice/frost prediction computer program 'SURFICE' was run as a comparison to infrared
scanner point measurements. The program predicted condensate, but no ice or frost, on the ET
acreage TPS.
The Thermal Protection Systems performed nominally during the tanking test. The Final
Inspection Team observed very light condensate, but no ice or frost accumulations, on the LO2
tank acreage. TPS surface temperatures ranged from 69 to 88 degrees F depending on sunlit or
shadowed areas. The sanded area on the LO2 tank ogive exhibited no anomalies and averaged 4
degrees Fahrenheit less (as measured by the infrared radiometer) than the adjacent acreage foam.
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The new cameras mounted in the GOX vent hood were partially successful. The camera
observing the northeast louver failed prior to LO2 tank loading. However, the camera observing
the southwest louver showed no frost formation until the seal was deflated and the hood
retracted. After the GOX vent arm was retracted, no ice formation was detected on either louver
using the other OTV cameras. During the Final Inspection, condensate had been detected on the
composite nose cone between the fairing and the southwest GOX seal. The condensate may have
formed due to the thermal conductivity of the underlying attachment brackets. If the formation of
condensate in this area is a characteristic of the new composite nose cones, problems with icing
may be encountered during cold weather conditions.
3.4 LH2 AND LO2 DRAIN
Other than venting from the LH2 recirculation line burst disks - a typical occurrence during ET
drain - no anomalies or concerns were identified. The venting may have originated from a PDL
repair on the recirculation line bellows cover. No cracks in the TPS, venting of vapors, liquid air
drips, or unexpected ice formations were detected.
L,
Photo 2:ET-96 SLWT LO2 Tank
A major vehicle configuration change, and the reason for the tanking test, was the first use of the
new Super Light Weight (External) Tank (SLWT). Note black composite nose cone, visible
welds along panel lines due to the thinner foam, and the sanded area on the +Z side.
9
Photo 3: Composite Nose Cone
This is the second use/flight of the graphite-epoxy composite nose cone
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Photo 4: +Z Side Sanded Area
Postulated contour deviations on the LO2 tank forward-to-aft ogive weld (station 536, +Z side)
could have resulted in as-sprayed NCFI TPS cracking after the tank was pressurized. Per FEC, a
local area 100 inches long by 11 inches wide was sanded over the suspect area to reduce the TPS
outer fiber strain and increase the strain capability of the foam. The foam thickness was reduced
from an average of 2.30 inches to 1.25 inches. After machining, the edges of the trim area were
beveled.
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Photo 5: SLWT Intertank Stringers
Intertank and thrust panel stringer heads/valleys are machined in the SLWT configuration
12
Photo 6:STS-91 Tanking Test
The tanking test was conducted on Pad 39A with the STS-91 SSV including the primary
flight elements OV-103 Discovery, ET-96, and BI-091 SRB's
13
Photo 7: SLWT-Z Side
No anomalies were detected on the -Z side of the SLWT after cryoload.
Note black composite flight door and sanded stringer heads/valleys on the intertank.
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Photo 8:LO2 Tank After Cryoload
The Thermal Protection Systems performed nominally during the tanking test. The Final
Inspection Team observed very light condensate, but no ice or frost accumulations, on the LO2
tank acreage. TPS surface temperatures ranged from 69 to 88 degrees F depending on sunlit or
shadowed areas.
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Photo 9: Composite Nose Cone
No anomalies were detected on the composite nose cone though condensate could
be seen over the attach bracket fastener area between the -Y louver and the fairing.
16
Photo _lO:+Z SideSandedArea
The sandedarea on the LO2 tank ogive exhibited no anomaliesand averaged4 degrees
Fahrelaheitless(asmeasuredby theinfraredradiometer)thantheadjacentacreagefoam.No ice,
frost,or condensateaccumulationsweredetected.
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Photo 11: _ntertank Stringers
Two cracks were detected in the +Y+Z quadrant of the intertank. One crack was located in the
second stringer valley in the +Y direction from the PAL ramp; the second crack was located in
the second stringer valley in the +Z direction from the +Y thrust panel (arrows). The cracks
appeared to originate from the as-sprayed foam at the aft end of the stringers extending forward
approximately 7 inches from the LH2 tank splice. Each crack was no greater than 1/16 inch wide
with no visible offset or ice/frost formatiom Although the NSTS-08303 Ice/Debris Inspection
Criteria documents an intertank TPS crack in the -Y-Z quadrant as acceptable for flight, no such
case was available for cracks in the +Y+Z quadrant. Consequently, an IPR was taken to
determine this condition was acceptable for flight as well.
18
]Photo12: Bipods
No anomaliesweredetectedon thebipodstand-offjack padcloseouts
or thespindlehousingcloseouts
19
Photo 13: -Y Vertical Strut
A 10-inch long by ¼-inch wide stress relief crack had formed, as expected,
on the -Y vertical strut forward facing TPS.
2O
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Photo 14:LH2 ET/ORB Umbilical
Typical amounts of ice/frost had accumulated on the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical purge barrier
outboard side and forward surface. Typical ice/frost fingers were present on the pyro canister and
plate gap purge vents. No unusual vapors or cryogenic drips had appeared during tanking and
stable replenish.
21
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Photo 15: Aft Dome Apex
New configuration of the aft dome apex eliminated the +Z manhole cover
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4.0 POST TANKING SSV INSPECTION
A Post Drain Inspection of the Space Shuttle Vehicle, with emphasis on the new Super Light
Weight External Tank (ET-96), was performed from May 18 t_ to May 20 th, 1998.
No anomalies were detected during the first ET post drain inspection on 18 May 1998
immediately after drain was completed.
The dimensions of the stress relief crack in the -Y vertical strut had not changed. No crushed
foam in the LO2 feedline brackets could be seen from the MLP deck. The sanded area on the
LO2 tank ogive exhibited no ice formations or foam damage.
The two 7-inch cracks in the intertank stringer valley foam had closed completely.
A more detailed, "hands-on" inspection using RSS platforms was performed on 20 May 1998.
No anomalies were detected in the sanded area on the LO2 ogive at the XT-536 weld.
The two 7-inch cracks in the ET intertank stringer valleys (+Y+Z quadrant), had closed to barely
visible hairline cracks. The IPR taken during the tanking test was upgraded to a PR with an MRB
to use as-is rationale.
Inspection of the LO2 feedline revealed a small piece of loose foam in the XT-1123 support
bracket (aft side). The foam particle was removed and the remaining foam was only superficially
damaged. Likewise, a small piece of loose foam was removed from the XT-1377 inboard support
bracket (aft side). A second piece, measuring 2-3/8 inches long by 1-5/8 inches wide by 1-1/8
inches deep at the thickest point, was removed from the support bracket shock absorber (inboard
side). All of these damage sites were typical of an ET detank, considered to be acceptable for
flight, and submitted as an MRB to use as-is with no repair required.
A 0.5-inch diameter void occurred in the approximate center of a repair on the LH2 feedline to
aft dome closeout. The loose foam in this void was removed and the discrepant area repaired
prior to launch.
As expected, the stress relief crack on the -Y vertical strut had closed to a barely discernible
hairline crack. This condition is acceptable for flight per the NSTS-08303 criteria.
From an Ice and TPS perspective, the tanking test was successful resulting in only minor TPS
defects. There were no TPS constraints for launch cryoload.
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Photo 16: Composite Nose Cone
No anomalies were detected on the black graphite-epoxy composite nose cone
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Photo 17: +Z Side Sanded Area
The sanded area on the LO2 tank ogive at the XT-536 weld exhibited
no ice formations or foam damage.
25

Photo 18: Intertank Stringer Foam Cracks
The two 7-inch cracks in the ET intertank stringer valleys (+Y+Z quadrant), had closed to barely
visible hairline cracks. The IPR taken during the tanking test was upgraded to a PR with an MRB
to use as-is rationale.
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Photo 19: -Y Vertical Strut
The size of the stress relief crack in the -Y vertical strut had not changed during drain
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5.0 LAUNCH
STS-91 was launched at 98:153:22:06:17.008 UTC (6:06 p.m. local) on 2 June 1998.
5.1 PRE-LAUNCH SSV/PAD DEBRIS INSPECTION
A pre-launch debris inspection of the launch pad and Shuttle vehicle was performed on 1 June
1998. The detailed walkdown of Pad 39A and MLP-1 also included the primary flight elements
OV-103 Discovery (24 th flight), ET-96 first Super Light Weight Tank, and BI'091 SRB's: There
were no significant vehicle or launch pad anomalies.
With the June launch and a liftoff time late in the day before sunset, weather conditions were
expected to be warm and preclude the formation of acreage ice on the External Tank.
5.2 FINAL INSPECTION
The Final Inspection of the cryoloaded vehicle was performed on 2 June 1998 _om i2_0:io 1_20
hours during the two hour built-in-hold at T-3 hours in the countdown. There were no Launch
Commit Criteria (LCC), OMRS, or NSTS-08303 criteria Violations. No ice_ Debris, or TPS
IPR's were taken. There were no acreage icing concerns. There were also no protuberance icing
conditions outside of the established data base.
A portable Shuttle Thermal Imager (STI) infrared scanning radiometer was utilized to obtain
vehicle surface temperature measurements for an overall thermal assessment of the vehicle,
particularly those areas not visible from remote fixed scanners, and to scan for unusual
temperature gradients.
5.2.1 ORBITER
No Orbiter tile or RCC panel anomalies were: observed. All RCS thruster covers were intact
though one cover on thruster L1L was slightly wet. Condensate had formed on SSME #1 and #2
heat shield-to-nozzle interfaces. The SSME #3 heat shield was dry. An infrared scan revealed no
unusual temperature gradients on the base heat shield or engine mounted heat shields.
5.2.2 SOLID ROCKET BOOSTERS
SRB case temperatures measured by the STI radiometers were close to ambient temperatures. All
measured temperatures were above the 34 degrees F minimum requirement. The predicted
Propellant Mean Bulk Temperature supplied by THIO was 77 degrees F, which was within the
required range of 44-86 degrees F.
5.2.3 EXTERNAL TANK
The ice/frost prediction computer program 'SURFICE' was run as a comparison to infrared
scanner point measurements. The program predicted condensate, but no ice or frost, on the ET
acreage TPS.
The Thermal Protection Systems performed nominally during cryoload. The Final Inspection
Team observed very light condensate, but no ice or frost accumulations, on the LO2 tank
acreage. TPS surface temperatures ranged from 82 to 92 degrees F depending on sunlit or
shadowed areas. The sanded area on the LO2 tank ogive exhibited no anomalies. Light
condensate was visible on the composite nose cone between the fairing and the southwest louver.
Two cracks were detected in the +Y+Z quadrant of the intertank. One crack was located in the
second stringer valley in the +Y direction from the PAL ramp; the second crack was located in
the second stringer valley in the +Z direction from the +Y thrust panel. The cracks appeared to
originate from the as-sprayed foam at the aft end of the stringers extending forward
approximately 7 inches from the LH2 tank splice. These two cracks had been documented during
the tanking test.
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Two new, similar cracks were detected. A 4-inch crack was located in the -Y+Z quadrant in the
second stringer valley from the thrust panel and a 6-8 inch crack was located in the -Y-Z
quadrant in the second stringer valley from the thrust panel.
All four cracks were no greater than 1/16 inch wide with no visible offset or ice/frost formation
and were acceptable for flight per the NSTS-08303 criteria and tanking test IPR rationale.
A small area of frost with no ice formation was visible at the aft outboard comer of the +Y bipodjack pad standoff bolt hole closeout.
!
The Final Inspection Team observed very light condensate, but no ice or frost accumulations, on
the LH2 tank acreage. TPS surface temperatures ranged from 76 to 82 degrees F depending more
on sunlit versus shadowed area readings than the "thick/thin" TPS configuration. A 2,inch
diameter ice/frost ball at the +Y vertical strut to ET aft dome interface was determined to be no
threat to the Orbiter. Both TPS repairs on the LH2 feedline and LH2 umbilical were in nominal
condition.
Less than usual amounts of ice/frost had accumulated in the LO2 feedline bellows and supportbrackets.
A 12-inch long by 3/8-inch wide stress relief crack had formed, as expected, on the -Y vertical
strut forward facing TPS. There was no ice/frost present and no offset. The condition was
acceptable for launch per the NSTS-08303 criteria.
There were no TPS anomalies on the LO2 ET/ORB umbilical. Ice/frost accumulations were
limited to small patches on the aft and inboard sides. Ice/frost fingers on the separation bolt
pyrotechnic canister purge vents were typical.
Ice and frost in the LH2 recirculation line bellows and on both burst disks was typical. The LH2
feedline bellows were wet with condensate.
A typical amount of ice/frost had accumulated on the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical purge barrier
outboard side. Ice/frost formation on the forward surface of the umbilical was somewhat heavier
than usual. Typical ice/frost fingers were present on the pyro canister and plate gap purge vents.
No unusual vapors or cryogenic drips had appeared during tanking, stable replenish, and launch.
5.2.4 FACILITY
All SRB sound suppression water troughs were filled and properly configured for launch.
No leaks were observed on the GUCP or the LO2 and LH2 Orbiter T-0 umbilicals.
A drive adapter used to extend/retract the side platforms on an MLP Tail Service Mast was
discovered by the Final Inspection Team at the northeast comer of the LO2 TSM during the T-3
hour inspection. The steel adapter was 2-inches in diameter and weighed a half pound. A recent
modification called for the adapters (three adapters per TSM) to be permanently attached to the
drive shafts with set screws. In this case, the set screw apparently backed out during platform
operations causing the adapter to hang loosely at the end of the shaft. As a result of this finding,
all adapters have been changed to a pinned design.
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5.3 T-3 HOURS TO LAUNCH
After completion of the Final Inspection on the pad, surveillance continued from the Launch
Control Center. Twenty-two remote controlled television cameras and two infrared radiometers
were utilized to perform scans of the vehicle. No ice or frost on the acreage TPS was detected.
Protuberance icing did not increase noticeably. Even with the decrease in ambient temperature,
no icing concerns were predicted. At T-2:30, the GOX vent seals were deflated and the GOX
vent hood lifted. Although frost covered some of the ET nose cone louvers - an expected
condition - no ice was detected. When the heated purge was removed by retraction of the GOX
vent hood, frost continued to form on the louvers and area of the composite nose cone
surrounding the louvers until liftoff.
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Photo 20:STS-91 Ready for Launch
OV-103 Discovery, ET-96 first Super Light Weight Tank, and B_-091 SRB's. The Final
Inspection Team observed very light condensate, but no ice or frost accumulations, on the LH2
tar_ acreage. TPS surface temperatures ranged from 76 to 82 degrees F.
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Photo 21:LO2 Tank After Cryoload
The Final Inspection Team observed very light condensate, but no ice or frost accumulations, on
the LO2 tank acreage. TPS surface temperatures ranged from 82 to 92 degrees F.
Note configuration change to the intertank stringer heads and valleys, which have been sanded.
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Photo22: Composite Nose Cone
Light condensate was visible on the composite nose cone between the fairing
and the southwest louver
33
Photo 23:LO2 Tank Sanded Area
The sanded area on the LO2 tank ogive exhibited no anomalies
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Photo 24: Cracks in Intertank Foam
Small cracks, ranging in length from 4 to 8 inches, were detected in three of the four intertank
quadrants in stringer valleys near the LH2 tank-to-intertank flange closeout. The cracks appeared
to originate from the as-sprayed foam at the aft end of the stringers extending forward from the
LH2 tank splice.
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Photo 25: Cracks in Intertank Foam
All of the cracks were no greater than 1/16 inch wide with no visible offset or ice/frost formation
and were acceptable for flight per the NSTS-08303 criteria and tanking test IPR rationale.
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Photo 26: -Y Vertical Strut
A 12-inch long by 3/8-inch wide stress relief crack had formed, as expected, on the -Y vertical
strut forward facing TPS. There was no ice/frost present and no offset. The condition was
acceptable for launch per the NSTS-08303 criteria.
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Photo 27: Overall View of SSME's
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6.0 POST LAUNCH PAD DEBRIS INSPECTION
The post launch inspection of MLP 1, Pad A FSS, RSS, and pad apron was conducted on 2 June
1998 from Launch + 2 to 3.5 hours. No flight hardware was found.
Although Boeing - Downey reported an Orbiter liftoff lateral acceleration of 0.19 g's, which is
above the threshold (0.14 g's) for stud hang-ups, an actual stud hand-up did not occur on this
launch. SRB south holddown post erosion was less than usual. North hotddown post bIast: co_,ers
and T-0 umbilicals exhibited typical exhaust plume damage. The right SRB aft skirt GN2 purge
line was intact and upright after liftoff. The left GN2 purge flex line was bent in half in _e÷Z
direction and exhibited structural damage (holes) and melting of the wire braid_
)
White Room were unhinged.
The GH2 vent line was latched in the eighth of eight teeth of the latching mechanism. The GUCP
7-inch QD surface exhibited no scuff marks. All observations indicated a nominal retraction and
latchback, though the GH2 vent line exhibited heat effects/damage from the SRB exhaust plume.
The aluminized thermal blanket was destroyed by the plume. The peripheral seal was scorched.
The GOX vent seals were in excellent shape with no indications of plume damage.
Debris findings on the FSS included loose floor gratings on the 115 foot level, approximately 20
feet of ¼-inch purge tube hanging loose from the south side of the RBUS deck, loose bolts/FOD
on the OIS station roof on the west side of the 115 foot level stairs, a loose cover on a 135 foot
level inactive panel, a 5-inch by 3-inch piece of zinc scale and a large grate clamp on the 195
foot level. Several of the stadium light lenses were broken.
Though a close inspection was not performed, no obvious unusual debris was noted in the flame
trench, in the north SRB plume blast area, or in the acreage. Those areas will be inspected
Wednesday. Overall, damage to the pad appeared to be minimal.
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Photo 29: Right SRBAft Skirt GN2 Purge Line
Theright SRBaft skirt GN2purgelinewasintactanduprightafterliftoff
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7.0 FILM REVIEW
Anomalies observed in the Film Review were presented to the Mission Management Team,
Shuttle managers, and vehicle systems engineers. No IPR's or IFA's were generated as a result of
the film review.
7.1 LAUNCH FILM AND VIDEO SUMMARY
A total of 83 films and videos, which included twenty-seven 16ram films, eighteen 35ram films,
and thirty-eight videos, were reviewed starting on launch day.
Most of the long range tracker imagery was degraded due to atmospheric haze. In addition, the
view from the northern trackers was often obscured by clouds.
SSME ignition appeared normal though formation of SSME Mach diamonds occurred in a 2-1-3
sequence (E-63, -76; OTV 071). A debris induced streak occurred in the SSME #1 exhaust
plume prior to T-0 at 22:06:23.661 UTC (E-2, -3, -19, -20, -52, -76).
SSME ignition caused numerous pieces of ice from the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical to fall aft. Some
pieces impacted the umbilical cavity sill, but no damage was visible (OTV-009, 063).
Surface coating material was lost during ignition from three small areas on base heat shield tiles
outboard of SSME #3, one area on the OMS base, three places on the right ACPS stinger, one
place on the aft surface of the left ACPS stinger, two places on the base heat shield outboard of
SSME #2, two places on the SSME #2 dome mounted heat shield, and two places on the body
flap upper surface outboard of SSME #3 (E-17, -18, -19, -20, -76; OTV-049, 050).
No anomalies were detected on the External Tank nose cone. No ice was present in the louvers
or "no ice" zone (OTV 013,061,062).
Although the lateral acceleration at liftoff was 0.19g, there were no stud hang-ups. No ordnance
debris or frangible nut pieces fell from the DCS/stud holes. The north HDP blast covers closed
normally. A debris object 1-2 inches long, possibly a K5NA trimming, emerged from the DCS
area of HDP #1 after T-0 (E-9).
-# !
Water leaked from the sound suppression water pipe joint near holddown post #4 (E-7).
The GN2 purge lines separated cleanly from both SRB aft skirts at liftoff. The purge lines were
visible for about two seconds after T-0 before being obscured from view. At that time, no
anomalies had been observed (E-8, -13).
Several cameras viewed more than usual amounts of MLP zinc-coated deck scale/paint flakes
lifted and moved by exhaust plume aspiration. No contact with flight hardware was detected.
An object that appeared to be a transparent plastic bag entered the field of view (FSS side) at
06:25.424 UTC and passed by the camera lens moving generally north away from the vehicle
(E-4).
GUCP disconnect and GH2 vent line retraction from the ET was normal. A dark particle falling
aft along with the pieces of ice is believed to be an insect (E-33).
A light colored particle appeared from the upper surface of the right wing and fell aft at T+I
second MET (OTV 054).
A dark object in the left SRB exhaust plume at 22:06:26.900 UTC was most likely a large piece
of SRB sound suppression water trough material (E-76).
42
+i __]_:_ / •
_i _ i_,_
As the vehicle was leaving the field of view, one of the yellow primary SRB sound suppression
water troughs was blown toward the SSME exhaust hole (E-5).
Condensation collars formed on the vehicle during ascent - an expected occurrence due to the
ambient weather conditions (TV-4, TV-21).
Debris induced streaks occurred in the SSME exhaust plumes during ascent at 22:06:52.839,
22:06:54.035, 22:07:01.818, and 22:07:05.922 UTC (E-213, -222, -223).
SRB tailoff and separation appeared normal. Slag falling out of the exhaust plume before, d_fig,
and after SRB separation was typical (TV-13).
::!i
ii!iii
::iii
"i
/i •
:1%1 •
43
: ....................•...................................................................:-::: ... ::<:_-:::: ::=:_:::::::_::_:::::::_:::_::_:_::,:::_:::::_:::-::: q:: ; 2 <Z >2t::;::i ;:IL;ZZ:L::::&_i;_,:i_i_:_i_Z_iiii_i;i_ii!i_i_;_i_iiii]_i_iii_;i_ii_ii_i_;Tiii_i_i_i_:
7.2 ON-ORBIT FILM AND VIDEO SUMMARY
OV-103 was equipped to carry umbilical cameras (for the first time): 16mm motion picture with
5 mm lens; 16mm motion picture with 10mm lens; 35mm still views. The flight crew provided
33 hand held still images and some video from the camcorder. Unfortunately, the video footage
was not usable. The still images were underexposed, but usable. The +X translation and a manual
pitch maneuver from the heads-up position were performed to bring the tank into view through
the overhead windows. "
7.2.1 ET/ORB Umbilical 16mm Films
)
SRB separation from the External Tank appeared nominal: The wqde an_e EYE;ORB I_.N7
mblhcal camera provided a view of both SRB forward skirts/frusmmstnose caps during
separation. The nose caps, which are not recovered for post flight inspection, were intact and
appeared to be in good condition.
ET-96 separation from the Orbiter was normal. No divots were detected in the LO2 and LH2
tank acreage. No anomalies were detected on the composite nose cone (second flight). The
sanded area on the LO2 tank at XT-536 was darkened somewhat due to ascent aeroheating, but
no divoting or loss of foam occurred.
Twenty to twenty-five light colored spots were detected in the -Y thrust panel acreage in an area
bordered by the LO2 and LH2 tank-to-intertank flange closeouts and from the thrust panel-to-
intertank splice to the tank curving out of view in the -Y direction. These light colored spots are
most likely small, shallow divots, most of which are in the areas between the ring frames.
However, some of the possible divots could be seen on the forward ring frame. Sunlight
reflection on the other ring frames made detection of possible divots more difficult. The +Y
thrust panel was in shadow and no detail could be discerned.
The +Z side of the intertank appeared to be in good condition with no acreage divots though
some very small "popcorn" type divots could be seen near the -Y thrust panel interface. Heating
from the shock waves off both forward EB fittings left black marks on the intertank acreage in a
diagonal line to the bipod spindle housings. These marks have not been so pronounced on
prevmus tanks and may be more visible due to the sanded foam acreage.
The jack pad standoff closeouts were intact. A 6-inch diameter divot was visible between the
bipods near centerline in the LH2 tank-to-intertank flange closeout. The divot may be associated
with a repaired area documented in the pre-launch photography. Two divots, 4-6 inches in
diameter, were present in the flange closeout -Y+Z quadrant. A much larger 10-inch long divot
was also present in the flange closeout near the -Y thrust panel. All three of these divots may be
associated with repaired areas documented in pre-launch photos. None of the divots were deep
enough to show primed substrate in this view.
Three light-colored areas, or spots, aft of the bipods on the LH2 tank acreage have been matched
to sanded areas documented in the pre-launch photography. Both +Y and -Y thrust struts
exhibited typical ascent erosion and very small divoting. No damage was observed on the LO2
feedline or either ET/ORB umbilical. Chamng and "popcorn" divoting of the aft dome was
typical.
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Photo31: SRB Separationfrom External Tank
The wide angle ET/ORB LH2 umbilical cameraprovided a view of both SRB forward
skirts/frustums/nosecapsduring separation.The nosecaps,which are not recoveredfor post
flight inspection,wereintactandappearedto bein goodcondition.
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Photo 32: ET After Separation from Orbiter
No divots were visible in the LO2 and LH2 tank acreage. Twenty to twenty-five light colored
spots were detected in the -Y thrust panel acreage in an area bordered by the LO2 and LH2 tank-
to-intertank flange closeouts and from the thrust panel-to-intertank splice to the tank curving out
of view in the -Y direction. These light colored spots are most likely small, shallow divots, most
of which are in the areas between the ring frames. However, some of the possible divots could be
seen on the forward ring frame. Two divots, 4-6 inches in diameter, were present in the flange
closeout -Y+Z quadrant. A much larger 10-inch long divot was also present in the flange
closeout near the -Y thrust panel (arrows).
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Photo 33: ET After Separation From Orbiter
The ET nose cone and ogive experienced ascent heating such that thin layers of foam from the
machined area between the top-coated area of the nose cone to the as-sprayed area on the LO2
tank ogive (on both +Y and -Y sides of the pressurization line/cable tray) charred and flaked off
in a pattern similar to that typically observed on the aft surfaces of the vertical struts. The loss of
charred foam left bright areas as "new" underlying foam was exposed. However, in perhaps 2 or
3 cases, the thin layers of lost foam may have been somewhat deeper almost to the point of being
very small divots. The sanded area on the LO2 tank at XT-536 was darkened somewhat due to
ascent aeroheating, but no divoting or loss of foam occurred.
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Photo 34:LH2 Tank Flange Closeout
The jack pad standoff closeouts were intact. A 6-inch diameter divot was visible between the
bipods near centerline in the LH2 tank-to-intertank flange closeout. The divot may be associated
with a repaired area documented in the pre-launch photography. Shadow, but no substrate, was
visible in this divot. A divot just aft of the -Y bipod spindle housing closeout appears to be
related to a previous repair documented in the pre-launch photography at the same location.
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Photo 35: ET LO2 ET/ORB Umbilical
The LO2 ET/ORB umbilical cable tray exhibited typical erosion and divoting. The umbilical
itself was undamaged. A 2-inch diameter divot was visible in the +Y thrust strut TPS. Note
typical erosion of foam from the LO2 feedline and thrust strut flange closeouts.
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Photo 36: -Y Thrust Panel
Lack of resolution prevented the clear confirmation of foam loss
and divoting on the -Y thrust panel
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7.3 LANDING FILM AND VIDEO SUMMARY
A total of 23 films and videos, which included nine 35mm large format films, one 16mm film,
and twelve videos, were reviewed.
The landing gear extended properly. The infrared scanners showed no debris falling from the
Orbiter during final approach.
Due to a cross wind out of the east, the Orbiter left main gear contacted the runway first followed
almost immediately by the right gear. The Orbiter became airborne again for approximately 1000
feet with the right main gear re-contacting the runway first.
Drag chute operation appeared nominal though the chute was intentionally deployed after the
nose gear contacted the runway because of the cross wind. Rollout and wheel stop were
uneventful.
TPS damage on the lower surface of both fight and left glove area was visible in some of the
films. More than usual tile damage sites were also visible on the base heat shield.
_i:_i _ii
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8.0 SRB POST FLIGHT/RETRIEVAL DEBRIS ASSESSMENT
The BI-091 Solid Rocket Boosters were inspected for debris damage and debris sources at CCAS
Hangar AF on 8 June 1998.
Both frustums were in excellent condition. No TPS was missing and no debonds/unbonds were
detected over fasteners or acreage. Virtually none of the Hypalon paint had blistered or peeled
with the exception of a fore-to-aft line of BTA closeout on the -Z side of the right frustum, All
eight BSM aero heat shield covers had locked in the fully opened position.
The forward skirts exhibited no debonds or missing TPS. RSS antennae covers/phenolic base
plates were intact though one phenolic layer on both +Z and -Z sides of the right SRB antenna
base plates had delaminated. Hypalon paint was blistered/missing over the areas where BTA
closeouts had been applied. All frustum severance ring pins and retainer clips were intact.
The Field Joint Protection System (FJPS) closeouts were generally in good condition. Trailing
edge damage to the FJPS and the GEI cork runs were attributed to debris resulting from
severance of the nozzle extension.
Separation of the aft ET/SRB struts appeared normal. Significant areas of missing insulation/cork
from the aft surface of the IEA showed the insulation had not bonded properly. The pristine
condition of the primed substrate indicated the insulation was lost at water impact rather than in
flight.
TPS on the external surface of both aft skirts was intact and in good condition.
The holddown post Debris Containment Systems (DCS) appeared to have functioned normally.
However, the HDP #1, 4, 6, and 8 DCS plungers were unseated by water impact. Although the
vehicle experienced a lateral acceleration of 0.19 g's at liftoff, the high speed launch films
showed no stud hang-ups. The aft skirt stud holes exhibited no new broaches.
Overall, the external condition of the SRB's appeared to be excellent.
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Photo 37: Frustum Post Flight Condition
Both frustums were in excellent condition. No TPS was missing and no debonds/unbonds were
detectedopenedposition.OVerfast ners or acreage. All eight BSM aero heat shield covers had locked in the fully
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Photo 38: Blistered Hypalon Paint
Virtually none of the Hypalon paint had blistered or peeled with the exception
of a fore-to-aft line of BTA closeout on the -Z side of the right frustum.
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Photo 40: Aft Booster/Aft Skirt Post Flight Condition
Separation of the aft ET/SRB struts appeared normal. TPS on the external surface of both aft
skirts was intact and in good condition.
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Photo 41: Missing IEA Insulation/Cork
Significant areas of missing insulation/cork from the aft surface of the IEA showed the insulation
had not bonded properly. The pristine condition of the primed substrate indicated the insulation
was lost at water impact rather than in flight.
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9.0 ORBITER POST LANDING DEBRIS ASSESSMENT
After the 2:00 p.m. local/eastern time landing on 12 June 1998, a post landing inspection of
OV-103 Discovery was conducted at the Kennedy Space Center on SLF runway 15 and in the
Orbiter Processing Facility bay #2. This inspection was performed to identify debris impact
damage and, if possible, debris sources.
The Orbiter TPS sustained a total of 198 hits, of which 50 had a major dimension of 1'inch or
larger. This total does not include the numerous hits on the base heat shield attributed to SSME
vibration/acoustics and exhaust plume recirculation. A comparison of these numbers to statistics
from 71 previous missions of similar configuration (excluding missions STS,23, 24, 25, 26, 26R,
27R, 30, 42, 86, 87, 89, and 90, which had damage from known debris sources), indicates both
the total number of hits and the number of hits 1-inch or larger was greater than average(reference Figures 1-4).
i2
The following table breaks down the STS-91 Orbiter debris damage by area:
HITS > 1" TOTAL HITS
Lower surface 45 145
Upper surface 0 3
Window Area 0 22
Right side 1 11
Left side 1 7
Right OMS Pod 2 5
Left OMS Pod 1 5
TOTALS 50 198
The Orbiter lower surface sustained 145 total hits, of which 45 had a major dimension of 1-inch
or larger. Most of this damage was concentrated aft of the nose to the main landing gear wheel
wells on both left and right chines. Virtually no damage occurred on the Orbiter centerline. These
damage sites follow the same location/damage pattern documented on STS-86, STS-87, STS-89,
and STS-90, though it should also be noted that this was the first flight of the new Super Light
Weight Tank. The average size and quantity of damage sites were greater than the favorable
trend established on STS-89 and STS-90:
STS-86 STS-87 STS-89 STS-90 STS-91 Fleet Avg.
Lower surface total hits 100 244 95 76 145 83
Lower surface hits > 1-inch 27 109 38 11 45 13
Longest damage site 7 in. 15 in. 2.8 in. 3.0 in. 3.0 in. N/A
Deepest damage site 0.4 in. 1.5 in. 0.2 in. 0.25 in. 0.5 in. N/A
At this time, most likely no lower surface tiles will be scrapped due to debris damage. The
largest lower surface tile damage site forward of the main landing gear wheel wells was located
on the left chine and measured 3-inches long by 1.25-inches wide by 0.25-inches deep. The
deepest lower surface tile damage site of'0.5-inches was located on the right chine.
6O
A damagesite measuring3.5-incheslong by 0.38-incheswide by 0.25-inchesdeepon thefight
inboardelevon did not appearto have beencausedby an ice impact from the LO2 ET/ORB
umbilical. This damagesite is directly aft of the fight chinedamageareasand may havebeen
causedby a 'secondary'debrisimpact.
Tile damagesitesaroundandaft of the LH2 and LO2 ET/ORB umbilicals were much less than
usual in size and quantity. This damage is usually caused by impacts from umbilical ice or
shredded pieces of umbilical purge barrier material flapping in the airstream.
The tires, which exhibited ply undercutting only on the RH inboard tire, were reported to be in
average condition for a landing on the KSC concrete runway.
ET/Orbiter separation devices EO-1, EO-2, and EO-3 functioned normally. No ordnance
fragments were found on the runway beneath the umbilical cavities. The EO-2 and EO-3 fitting
retainer springs were in nominal configuration. No clips were missing from the "salad bowls".
Virtually no umbilical closeout foam or white RTV dam material adhered to the umbilical plate
near the LH2 recirculation line disconnect.
The usual amounts of tile damage occurred on the base heat shield. A clustering of tile damage
sites at the acoustic focal point between SSME's #1 and #3 (14 hits total with 12 of the hits
larger than 1-inch in size) was not mirrored on the -Y side between SSME's #1 and #2. All
SSME Dome Mounted Heat Shield (DMHS) closeout blankets were in excellent condition. Two
small hits were located on tiles adjacent to the drag chute cavity. Two small tile hits on the
stinger were caused by debris in the plume recirculation rather than contact with the drag chute
risers.
No unusual tile damage was detected on the leading edges of the OMS pods. However, a
2.5-inch long by 0.75-inch wide by 0.25-inch deep gash on the left OMS pod may have been
caused by ice from the waste water dump nozzle. A 5-inch long by 1.5 inch wide by 1.5 inch
deep cavity along the edge of a blanket on the left OMS pod probably was caused by a portion of
the blanket coming loose and flailing in the air flow. An adjacent white tile did not appear to be
damaged. Three small damage sites were observed on the leading edge of the vertical stabilizer.
Hazing and streaking of forward-facing Orbiter windows was moderate to heavy. Damage sites
on the window perimeter tiles was less than usual in quantity and size. Some of the damage sites
were attributed to old repair material falling out and were not included in this assessment.
The post landing walkdown of Runway 15 was performed immediately after landing. No debris
concerns were identified. All drag chute hardware was recovered and appeared to have
functioned normally. The two pyrotechnic devices on the reefing line cutters had been expended.
In summary, both the total number of Orbiter TPS debris hits and the number of hits 1-inch or
larger was greater than the fleet average when compared to previous missions (reference Figures
5-6).
 iiii
61
1.75 x 0.6 x 0.25
1.5 x 0.75 x 0.25
1.5 x I x 0.25
1.5 x I x 0.25
1.5 x 2 x 0.25
0.75 x i x 0.13
2 x I x 0.2
2.25 x 1 x 0.25
:,_ 1.5 x 0.75 x 0.25
::': 3 x 1.25 x 0.25
i
2 x 1.25 x 0.3 •_
_:: 1 Dia x 0.25 •
1.5 x 1.25 x 0.25 _1.5 x 1 x 0.25 ••
1.25 x 0.5 x 0.13,
1.5 x I x 0.25/ •
• 1 x 0.38 x 0.13/
ii i GAP FILLER /
• 1.25 x 1.5 x _•
ii 0.25f /i :
• 5•
i!:
i
TOTAL HITS = 145
HITS > 1 INCH = 45
ALL DIMENSIONS
IN INCHES
1 x 1.25 x 0.25
.25 Dia x 0.3
1 x 0.75 x 0.3
1xlx0.3
1xlx0.2
1 x 1.5 x 0.5
1.25 x i x 0.1
1.25 x 1.5 x 0.25
2.88 x 1.25 x 0.3
1.25 x 1.25 x 0.2
1.75 x 0.5 x 0.13
2.75 x I x 0.25
0.5x lx0.1
_-----0.38 x 1.5 x 0.25
I x 0.5 x 0.3
i x 0,38 x 0.3
11 x51_2_ _50_30. 3
1.25 x 0.75 x 0.25
!55xX21xXo%
.5 x 1.5 x 0.25
x lx 0.13
RIGHT WING
1 x 0.38 x 0.25
lx 0.75 x 0.13
1.75 x 0.75 x 0.25
3.5 x 0.38 x 0.25 (2 tiles)
Figure 1: Orbiter Lower Surface Debris Damage Map
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Figure 2: Orbiter Left Side Debris Damage Map
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Figure 3: Orbiter Right Side Debris Damage Map
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Figure 4: Orbiter Upper Surface Debris Damage Map
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Photo 42: Orbiter Landing at KSC
OV-103 Discovery landed at 2:00 p.m. local/eastern time on 12 June 1998
at Kennedy Space Center's SLF runway 15
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Photo 44: Lower Surface Tile Damage
The Orbiter lower surface sustained 145 total hits, of which 45 had a major dimension of 1-inch
or larger. Most of this damage was concentrated aft of the nose to the main landing gear wheel
wells on both left and right chines. Virtually no damage occurred on the Orbiter centerline.
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Photo 45: Lower Surface Tile Damage
These damage sites follow the same location/damage pattern documented on STS-86, STS-87,
STS-89, and STS-90, though it should also be noted that this was the first flight of the new Super
Light Weight Tank. The average size and quantity of damage sites were greater than the
favorable trend established on STS-89 and STS-90:
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Photo 46: Base Heat Shield
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Photo 47:LO2 ET/ORB Umbilical
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Photo 48:LH2 ET/ORB Umbilical
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1. STS.91 (0V-103) Film/Video Screening and Timing Summary
. STS-91 (OV-103): FILM/VIDEO SCREENING AND TIMING
SUMMARY
_iii_ ,
i_i: i
1.1 SCREENING ACTIVITIES
1.1.1 Launch
!
The STS-91 launch of Discovery (OV-103) from Pad A occurred on Tuesday,
June 2, 1998 at approximately 153:22:06:24.16 UTC as seen on camera
OTV050. SRB separation occurred at approximately 22:08:26,966 UTC as seen
on camera ET207.
:2 _
i
i _
On launch day, 24 of the 24 expected videos were received and screened. No
anomalous events that would affect the Orbiter re-entry and landin_ were seen.
Twenty launch films were screened on June 5, 1998, Twenty-two additional
films were received for contingency support and anomaly resolution, but were
not screened. :....
Umbilical well cameras flew for the first time on OV-103 on STS-91.
Photography of the left SRB and the LSRB/ET aft attach and the external tank aft
dome was acquired using umbilical well camera films during SRB separation.
Photography of the external tank was acquired during ET separation. Handheld
still photography of the ET was acquired following separation.
1.1.2 On-Orbit
No on-orbit tasks were requested. However, an on-orbit video of the fuel cell
product water relief nozzle (on the Orbiter starboard fuselage) was taken using
the RMS arm. This video was provided after landing to Space Shuttle engineers
investigating a water leak.
1.1.3 Landing
Discovery made an early afternoon landing on runway 15 at the KSC Shuttle
Landing Facility on June 12, 1998. Eleven videos and ten films were received.
The landing touchdown appeared normal, but with a slight skip. A sink rate
analysis of the main landing gear was performed for the touchdowns (see Section
2.6). The drag chute deployment appeared normal.
According to the pre-mission agreement, the STS-91 landing film was not
screened due to budgetary constraints.
1.2 LANDING EVENTS TIMING
The time codes from videos and films were used to identify specific events
during the screening process.
The landing and drag chute event times are provided in Table 1.2.
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2. Summary of Significant Events
i
o
2.1
SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS
DEBRIS FROM SSME IGNITION THROUGH LIFTOFF
As on previous missions, numerous light-colored pieces of debris were seen aft
of the launch vehicle before, during, and after the roll maneuver (umbilical ice
debris, RCS paper, SRB flame duct debris, and water baffle debris). Multiple
pieces of ice debris were seen falling from the ET/Orbiter umbilicals and along
the body flap during SSME ignition. Two pieces of ice/frost debris were seen to
contact the LH2 umbilical well door sill during S SME ignition (22:06:19.818 and
22:06:20.953 UTC). No damage to the umbilical well door sill was noted.
(Cameras OTV009, OTV054, OTV061, OTV063, E5, El7, E31, E34)
i •
i_/-_ _ ,
iil )!ii:
/:2' •;
Figure 2.1 (A) Dark-Colored Debris at SSME Ignition
A small dark-colored piece of debris (possibly an insect) was seen near the left
ET/Orbiter attach aft strut during S SME ignition (22:06:21.920 UTC) on camera
OTV009.
Prior to liftoff, a single piece of light-colored debris (possibly ice) was seen
falling along the base of the ET near the ET/Orbiter aft attach point
(22:06:20.419 UTC) on camera OTV054.
fl •
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2. Summary of Significant Events
Figure 2.1 (B) Debris Near LSRB at Liftoff
A large light-colored flexible piece of debris (probably from the sound
suppression water trough) was seen near the LSRB at liftoff (22:06:26.392 UTC)
on camera E5.
DEBRIS DURING ASCENT
Less than usual debris was seen aft of the launch vehicle during ascent. This
may be because of the clouds and haze that degraded the long range tracking
camera views.
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Figure 2.2 (A) Debris Near Right Wing During Liftoff
A single light-colored piece of debris was seen near the upper surface of the right
wing during liftoff (22:06:25.157 UTC) on camera OTV054. This debris was
probably not from the starboard water relief nozzle according to engineers
investigating the water leak anomaly.
On camera E224, a single light-colored piece of debris seen in the SSME exhaust
plume was timed at 22:06:31.658 UTC.
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Figure 2.2 (B) Possible Bird During Liftoff
2.3
On camera ET212, a single piece of debris (possibly a bird close to the camera)
appeared to be falling along the left SRB and near the left wing tip (22:06:34.377
UTC).
MOBILE LAUNCH PLATFORM (MLP) EVENTS
Orange vapor, probably free burning hydrogen, was seen forward of the SSME
rims during SSME ignition (El7, El8, El9, E20). Orange vapors drifting
forward from the aft end of the vehicle have been observed on previous missions.
Small areas of tile surface coating material erosion were seen during SSME
ignition at the base of SSME #2, on the SSME #2 Dome Mounted Heat Shield
(DMHS), and on the base heat shield outboard of SSME #3 (El7, El8).
A light-colored flash was seen in the SSME #1 exhaust plume prior to liftoff at
22:06:23.658 UTC (E2, El9, E20).
The SSME ignition appeared normal on the high-speed engineering films.
However the SSME Mach diamonds did not form in the expected sequence. The
times for the Mach diamond formation recorded in Table 2.3 below are from
camera film E 19.
i:
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i
2.4
SSME TIME (UTC)
SSME #2 22:06:20.862
SSME #1 22:06:20.946
SSME #3 22:06:20.954
Table 2.3 SSME Mach Diamond Formation
ASCENT EVENTS
<<iiiiill,
<><i_ii>
A white-colored flash (possibly debris induced) was seen in the SSME exhaust
plume during ascent at 22:06:41.731 UTC (E52, E222). ]i]>
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Figure 2.4
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Flare in SSME Exhaust Plume During Ascent
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Several orange-colored flares (probably debris induced) were seen in the SSME
exhaust plume during ascent. On cameras KTV4A and ET207, flares were timed
at 22:07:04.892, 22:07:18.097, and 22:07:21.0 UTC. On camera film E224 with
digital timing, two of the flares were timed at 22:06:54.031 and 22:07:05.932
UTC (E207, E222, E223, E224, KTV4A, ET207).
Slight body flap motion was visible during ascent (E207, E212, E223). No
follow-up action was requested.
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2.5 ONBOARD PHOTOGRAPHY OF THE EXTERNAL TANK
Umbilical well cameras flew for the first time on OV-103 on STS-91. Two rolls
of the STS-91 16ram umbilical well film, one roll of 35mm umbilical well film,
and one roll of 35mm handheld film were received. The film quality is very
good on the three umbilical well camera films. The handheld film of the external
tank (ET) is underexposed but useable. The camcorder view of the ET is
unusable.
The +X translation maneuver was performed on STS-91 to facilitate the imaging
of the ET with the umbilical well cameras. The astronauts performed a manual
pitch maneuver from the heads-up position to bring the ET into view in the
Orbiter overhead windows for the handheld photography. (STS-91 was the
fourth flight using the roll-to-heads-up maneuver).
2.5.1 Analysis of the Umbilical Well Camera Films
Two rolls of 16ram umbilical well film and one roll of 35mm umbilical well film
were received. The film quality is very good on the three umbilical well camera
films. OV-103 provided timing data to the 16ram umbilical well cameras.
35ram Umbilical Well Camera Film
_!!!ii_!Iii!_
_ _i__2_
i__!iiill Figure 2.5.1 (A) Sanded Area on ET Nose Cone
The LH2 tank and the LO2 tank/Ojive TPS appeared to be in excellent condition
on the close-up 35mm umbilical well camera film. The sanded area on the ET
nose cone appeared undamaged. Similar to STS-90 and other previous missions,
a gray-colored band of pock marked or possible missing TPS is visible on the +Z
ET nose just aft of the ET nose cone fairing. Discoloration in this area is
probably due to aero friction and heating.
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Ill
The intertank TPS appeared to be in better condition than usual with only a very
small divot visible on an aft intertank stringer head forward of the bipod.
i_i'iiiii!!_
i ¸ •
i,i[!
311•
ii
Figure 2.5.1 (B) ET +Y Thrust Panel
The visible portion (+Z/+Y) of the right SRB thrust panel was in shadow on the
35mm umbilical well film. Digital enhancements were made from the film in an
attempt to detect TPS damage on the right ET intertank thrust panel. However,
the presence of damage on this panel could not be confirmed. The left SRB
thrust panel was not imaged on the 35mm umbilical well film.
i!i!i
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..!6ram Umbilical Well Camera Film
The LSRB separation appeared normal on the 16mm umbilical well camera
films. Numerous light-colored pieces of debris (insulation), and dark debris
(charred insulation) were seen throughout the SRB separation film sequence.
Typical ablation and charring of the ET/Orbiter LH2 umbilical electric cable tray
and the aft surface of the -Y upper strut fairing prior to SRB separation were
seen. Numerous irregularly-shaped pieces of debris (charred insulation) were
noted near the base of the LSRB electric cable tray prior to SRB separation. Two
pieces of TPS were seen to detach from the aft surface of the horizontal section
of the -Y ET vertical strut. Normal blistering of the fire barrier material on the
outboard side of the LH2 umbilical was seen. Ablation of the TPS on the aft
dome was normal. Both the left and right SRB nose caps were visible during
SRB separation.
The ET separation from the Orbiter appeared normal. Vapor and multiple light-
colored pieces of debris were seen after the umbilical separation. Several pieces
of white debris (frozen hydrogen) were seen striking the forward surface of the
LH2 electric cable tray. No damage to the cable tray was detected. A linear-
shaped, flexible piece of debris (possibly tape from the umbilical purge barrier
material) was seen near the base of the LH2 umbilical during ET separation.
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m
No anomalies were noted on the face of the LH2 umbilical after ET separation.
As typically seen on previous missions, frozen hydrogen was visible on the
orifice of the LH2 17 inch connect.
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Figure 2.5.1 (D) ET -Y Intertank Thrust Panel (16mm Umbilical Film)
A large bright-colored area of possible divots was noted on the forward portion
of the visible (-Y/+Z) left intertank thrust panel. Other light-colored marks were
seen on the left intertank thrust panel. However, some of these light-colored
marks appeared to coincide with small ramps on the thrust panel seen on the
close-out photography and may not indicate damage.
A divot was visible under the ET/Orbiter attach bipod in the LH2 tank-to-
intertank close-out flange. Two divots were visible in the LH2 tank-to-intertank
flange close-out in the -Y/+Z quadrant. A divot approximately ten inches in
diameter was also visible in the same flange near the lower right corner of the
left thrust panel. Dark-colored linear-shaped marks, possibly from shock waves
off the left EB fitting, were visible extending diagonally across the -Y/+Z
intertank stringer heads toward the bipod.
2.5.2 Analysis of the Handheld Photography of the ET
Thirty-three images of the ET were acquired using the handheld 35mm Nikon
camera with a 400mm lens (roll 333). The images of the ET were very faint and
silhouetted by the late afternoon sun. The camera used for the ET handheld
photography launched with the wrong camera settings resulting in under exposed
photography. Views of the sides, nose, and aft end of the ET were acquired.
However, the +Y side of the ET was in shadow and too dark for analysis.
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The distance of the ET from the Orbiter could not be accurately measured from
the photography because of the dark shadows on one side of the ET. Timing data
is present on the film. The first picture was taken at 16:29 (minutes:seconds)
MET.
2.5.2.1 Analysis Findings
, i / ¸
i__, _
Figure 2.5.2.1 (A) ET -Y Intertank Thrust Panel (Handheld Film)
Damage to the external tank, including both intertank thrust panels, was not
confirmed from the available handheld camera views. However, approximately
five light-colored marks were visible on the -Y thrust panel forward of the EB
fitting. An additional three to four light-colored marks were noted on the close-
out flange between the forward end of left intertank thrust panel and the LO2
tank TPS. These light-colored marks may indicate possible damage, but this was
not confirmed because of the limited resolution.
_:i_
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Figure 2.5.2.1 (B) ET Venting
Venting from what appeared to be the -Y intertank hydrogen vent was recorded
on ten frames (see Table 2.5.2.1).
FRAME GMT TIME MET
(Hr:Min:Sec) (Min:Sec)
STS-91-333-012 22:23:07 16:43
STS-91-333-014 22:23:09 16:45
STS-91-333-015 22:23:10 16:46
STS-91-333-018 22:23:17 16:53
STS-91-333-019 22:23:18 16:54
STS-91-333-020 22:23:21 16:57
STS-91-333-031 22:24:38 18:14
STS-91-333-032 22:24:44 18:20
STS-91-333-037 22:25:05 18:41
STS-91-333-038 22:25:10 18:46
Table 2.5.2.1 ET Venting Times from Handheld Camera
The ET rate of tumble, i.e., the end-to-end rotation of the ET about its center of
mass, was estimated to be approximately 11 deg/sec. The rate of roll about the
ET X axis could not be determined due to shadowing. Table 2.5.2.2 contains a
STS-91 JSC Summary Report A 17
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comparison of the averaged tumble rate measurements for the previous four
Space Shuttle missions. Venting was seen on all four missions.
MISSION
t
TUMBLE RATE MET
(degrees/second) (min: sec)
STS-87 11 17:23 - 18:08
STS-89 12 31:42 - 35:27
STS-90 3 14:30"
STS-91 11 16:29 - 18:46
* Only the first four frames had timing. Relative time from video was used to
determine the STS-90 tumble rate.
Table 2.5.2.2 ET Tumble Rates
The normal SRB separation burn scars and aero-heating marks were noted on the
-Y intertank and nose TPS of the ET.
Images of white-colored, irregular shaped, debris were also acquired. This debris
appeared to be pieces of frozen hydrogen and are typically seen on the ET post
separation photography.
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2.6 LANDING EVENTS
2.6.1 Landing Sink Rate Analysis
Film camera EL-7 was used to determine the landing sink rate of the main gear.
In the analysis, data from approximately one second of imagery immediately
prior to touchdown was considered. Data points defining the main gear struts
were collected on every frame (100 frames during the last second prior to touch
down). An assumption was made that the line of sight of the camera was
perpendicular to the Orbiter's y-axis. The distance between the main gear struts
was used as a scaling factor. The main gear height above the runway was
calculated by the vertical difference between the main gear struts and the
reference point. These heights were then regressed with respect to time and the
trendline was determined. Sink rate equals the slope of this regression line.
The left main gear sink rate for STS-91 landing at one second, at half a second,
and at a one quarter of a second are provided in Tables 2.6.1 (A) and 2.6.1 (B).
Plots of these sink rates are provided in Figures 2.6.1 (A) and 2.6,1 (B).
Time Prior to i
Touchdown
Left Main Gear
1.00 Sec. 0.50 Sec. i 0.25 Sec. _'_:
I !
3.9 ft/sec4.9 ft/sec 4.2 ft/sec
Sink Rate I !
Estimated Error (lcy) _+0.2 ft/sec II + 0.2 ft/sec i _+0.1 ft/sec _
1st Touchdown (Left Main Gear) = 18:00:17.048 (UTC)
Table 2.6.1 (A) Landing Sink Rate (1st Touchdown)
ii:i'_i'
,i
?i:
<ii;_ _
Time Prior to i 1.00 Sec. 0.50 Sec.
Touchdown I !
Right Main Gear I 1.1 ft/sec i 1.7 ft/sec
Sink Rate i i
0.25 Sec. _!
2.6 ft/sec
Estimated Error (1or) ! + 0.4 ft/sec ! + 0.3 ft/sec
2nd Touchdown (Right Main Gear) = 18:00:20.463 (UTC)
+ 0.2 ft/sec
Table 2.6.1 (B) Landing Sink Rate (2nd Touchdown)
GI,
The maximum allowable main gear sink rate values are 9.6 ft/sec for a 212,000
lb. vehicle and 6.0 ft/sec for a 240,000 lb. vehicle. The landing weight of the
STS-91 vehicle was estimated to be 226,725 lbs.
:ii!ii_i
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STS-91 Main Gear Landing Sink Rate
1st Touchdown
(Camera EL-7)
8 , .................. j
z
::::::::5
4
3
2
0
-1
Time relative to main gear touchdown (seconds)
• height _trend 1.0s ...... trend 0.5s _ - "trend 0.25s I
Figure 2.6.1 (A) Landing Sink Rate (1st Touchdown)
STS-91 Main Gear Landing Sink Rate
2nd Touchdown
(Camera EL-7)
Time relative to main gear touchdown (seconds)
[_ height --trend 1.0s _trend 0.5s .... trend 0.25s i
Figure 2.6.1 (B) Landing Sink Rate (2nd Touchdown)
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A sink rate analysis of the nose gear was not performed on STS-91 due to
budgetary constraints.
2.7 OTHER
_ H _
i_ ,
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2.7.1 Normal Events
Normal events observed included inboard elevon and body flap motion prior to
liftoff, RCS paper debris, ET twang, ice and vapor from the LO2 and LH2 TSM
T-0 umbilical prior to and after disconnect, multiple pieces of ET/Orbiter
umbilical ice debris falling along the body flap during liftoff, acoustic waves in
the exhaust cloud during liftoff, debris in the exhaust cloud after liftoff,
expansion waves after liftoff, vapor off the SRB stiffener rings, charring of the
ET aft dome, ET aft dome outgassing, condensation around the launch vehicle
during ascent, linear optical effects, recirculation, SRB plume brightening, and
slag debris during and after SRB separation.
2.7.2 Normal Pad Events
Normal pad events observed included the Hydrogen burn ignitor operation, the
FSS deluge water activation, the sound suppression system water operation, the
MLP deluge water activation, GH2 vent arm retraction, and the TSM T-0
umbilical operations and TSM door closure.
ii• •
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Introduction
The launch of space shuttle mission STS-91, the 24th flight of the Orbiter Discovery occurred on June
2, 1998 at approximately 5:06 P.M. Central Daylight Time (CDT) from Launch Complex 39A
(LC-39A), Kennedy Space Center (KSC), Florida. Launch time was reported as 98:153:22:06:17.008
Universal Coordinated Time (UTC) by the MSFC Flight Evaluation Team. Photographic and video
coverage has been evaluated to determine proper operation of the flight hardware. Video and high-speed
film cameras providing this coverage are located on the fixed service structure (FSS), mobile launch
platform (MLP), LC-39A perimeter sites, Eastern Test Range tracking sites and onboard the vehicle.
Engineering Analysis Objectives
The planned engineering photographic and video analysis objectives for STS-91 include, but are not
limited to the following:
• Verification of cameras, lighting and timing systems.
• Overall propulsion system coverage for anomaly detection and structural integrity.
• Determination of SRB PIC firing time and SRB separation time.
• Verification of SRB and ET Thermal Protection System (TPS) integrity.
• Correct operation of the following:
o SSME ignition and mainstage
o SRB debris containment system
o LH2 and LO2 17-inch disconnects
o Ground umbilical carrier plate (GUCP)
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o Free hydrogen ignitors
o Booster separation motors (BSM)
Camera Coverage Assessment
The following table illustrates the camera coverage received at MSFC for STS-91.
i6mm '35ram ....70ram .... Vide-if-
MLP ............. |8- ......... --_ ................. 0...... ----4---
FSS .............. 4 ........ 0- ........ 0 ............. -3---
Perimeter ..... 0-............... 6- ................0 .............. 6 ......
Traeidhg .............. o-............ -1-0.....................0 ....... i 1
Totals .......... -'2-4.......... ]8 ............... 0 ............. _2T .......
Total number of film and videos received:66
Individual camera assessments are provided in Appendix A.
Ground Camera Coverage
Photographic coverage of the STS-91 launch was considered good. Atmospheric haze and cloud
coverage degraded images from some tracking cameras. However, some images were improved due to
the afternoon sun angle. Camera E 15 did not operate due to a blown fuse. The timing on camera E 12
was incorrect.
Onboard Camera Coverage
Discovery carried two 16mm carmeras located in the orbiter LH2 umbilical well and a 35mm still
camera in the LO2 umbilical well recording SRB and ET separations. The Astronaunts also recorded
images of the ET after separation with a 35mm still camera. The Astronauts' still camera was
misconfigured prior to launch resulting in dark images of the ET. The umbilical well cameras provided
good images.
Anomalies
No anomalies were noted.
Observations
!i?
_4
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Prior to liftoff SSME number one produced an engine streak. This streak was not
the result of debris falling into the exhaust plume. Streaks like this have been noted
on previous launches and on SSME engine tests. These streaks are yellow to orange
in color and are visible in only one frame. These streaks are generally thought to be
caused by a small amount of contaminant in the fuel.
The onboard 16mm umbilical well camera with a 10mm lens recorded images of
the ET after separation. This image shows some TPS divots on the -Y Thrust
Panel. The divots appear as lighter color areas on the Thrust Panel. Also appearing
as lighter color areas are raised areas of the TPS which can be seen in this close-outphotograph taken of the -Y Thrust Panel prior to launch. The two photographs need
- to be compared to judge the amount of TPS divoting. An effort by KSC to map the
..................._ ..... TPS divots is shown in this image_ in-which areas of TPS divoting are drawn on the
close-out photograph.
Also carried onboard the umbilical wells was a 35mm still camera which recorded
_ this image of the forward portion of the ET. In this image two TPS divots can be
- seen under the forward Orbiter attach (bipod) on the L02 Tank/Intertank interface.
Two additional TPS divots were noted on this interface but not imaged in this
photograph. The rectangular sanded area on the L02 Tank looks in good condition
as well as the nose cone. The +Y Thrust Panel is in shadow and too dark to
determine if any TPS was lost.
Engineering Data Results
T-Zero Times
T-Zero times are determined from cameras that view the SRB holddown posts numbers M- 1, M-2, M-5,
and M-6. These cameras record the explosive bolt combustion products.
................ Camera '-- _ .........
Holddown Post Position i Time (UTC)
- M-1 ......... E9 . 22:06"24.016-
..... M-2 ...... E8 .... -22-i06:24.()i8
M_-5 .... Ei2 Timing Incorrect
.... Mk6- Ei3 ..... 22:06:24_0i6 _ •
SRB Separation Time
SRB separation as recorded by observations of the BSM combustion products from high speed film
camera E207 occurred at 153:22:08:26.98 UTC.
ET Tip Deflection
5:
•!•i• 4
The ET tip deflection was measured on this mission to check for consistency with
_revious flights since this was the first flight of the super-lightweight tank. The maximum tip deflection
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was measured as 31 inches with an accuracy of +/- one inch. The deflection data from STS-91 is
consistent with previously measured data.
Appendix A - Individual camera assessments
Appendix B - Definitions and acronyms
Individual fdm/video summary- report
Return to Engineering Photographic Analysis Reports
Return to MSFC Engineering Photographic Analysis Home Page
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